UK Government Response to the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament Report 'China'
China’s national imperative is to ensure that the Chinese Communist Party remains in power. Everything else is subservient to that.
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Entangled Duties: Law firms operating in Australia with PRC links
Law firms operating in Australia acting for PRC entities simultaneously fulfil engagements for Australian Government entities, including those responsible for national security and foreign policy.
Cambridge University and the Chinese military
UK-China Transparency: Cambridge University’s Centre for Advanced Photonics and Electronics (CAPE) and China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC) are involved in collaborative research involving a scientist who has served as a politician in China and in the People’s Liberation Army.
New Zealand’s Security Threat Environment 2023
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) has detected extensive interference activity targeting New Zealand’s diverse ethnic Chinese communities by groups and individuals linked to the intelligence arm of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).
UK Parliament's Intelligence and Security Committee 2023 Report on China
The UK is of significant interest to China when it comes to espionage and interference, given the UK's close relationship with the United States, membership of international bodies and the perception of the UK as an opinion-former.
Canadian Government's "Foreign Interference and You" Publication
As an advanced economy and an open and free democracy, Canada has long been targeted by hostile states seeking to acquire information, intelligence and influence to advance their own interests.
Legal practioners conceal client’s CCP ties in Australian Court
Chinese State Owned Enterprises (Chinese SOEs) are able to coerce experienced court practitioners to mislead superior Courts.
Australian Senator catches TikTok in a lie
Mr Brent Thomas, a representative for TikTok, admitted on 12 July 2022 that Australian TikTok user data is accessible in mainland China but that TikTok would not provide it to the Chinese Government if asked.
Lord Wei: An overview of UFWD engagement
This report finds consistent engagement between Lord Wei and entities controlled by, linked to or later subsumed by the United Front Work Department of the CCP Central Committee (中共中央统一战线工作部) between 2011 and 2016.
TikTok's excessive data harvesting program
TikTok used in Australia makes connections to Chinese servers, despite assurances to the contrary